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In South Africa, indigenous (African) knowledge is at the heart of a 
single detailed national Curriculum Assessment Policy Statement 
(2012). Against this background, the study on which this article is 
based, examined two long-standing genres of philosophy: Western 
philosophy, as a critical academic discipline and African philosophy, 
as a collective worldview. The article shows that universal philosophy 
and, by implication, a universal knowledge system transcends 
these seemingly particular, opposite and irreconcilable Euro-
centred and Afro-centred schools of thought. In doing so, the article 
proposes that universal philosophy as an inclusive, rational and 
reflective practice makes it possible to merge Western and African 
philosophies to form a single knowledge system. Unfortunately, the 
Curriculum Assessment Policy Statement emphasises indigenous 
African knowledge systems – thus, regresses to narrow African 
provincialism. In the end, the author (re)establishes a universal 
knowledge system as a sound African philosophy of education in 
post-apartheid South African schools. 
Keywords: Western philosophy, African philosophy, African 
philosophy of education, endogenous knowledge, Curriculum 
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1. Introduction
There are three main concepts that underpin this article, 
namely Bantu (popular) philosophy¹ Western (academic) 
philosophy² and universal (single) philosophy³. 
Bantu philosophy, is [a] single system and unique 
to [African people]. … True knowledge, human 
wisdom is dependent upon the wisdom of the 
[African] elders. One can learn to read, to write … 
but all that has nothing in common with wisdom 
(Tempels, 1959: 25–35).
Ethno-philosophy [one aspect of Bantu philosophy] 
exemplifies an essentialist/particularist orientation, 
while academic philosophy constitutes a paradigm 
case of universalism (Horsthemke, 2015: 18).
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This universality must be preserved … because these differences of content are 
meaningful precisely and only as differences of content, which, as such, refer back to the 
essential unity of a single discipline, of a single style of inquiry (Hountondji, 1996: 56). 
Below, I show how the three quotations above are integrated in the article in order to mount 
a clear, coherent and consistent argument. Tempels (1959), a Belgian missionary, sets out 
a systematic account of Bantu philosophy – a primitive philosophy foreign to European 
philosophers. The key principle of Bantu (indigenous) philosophy, Tempels maintains, was 
that Bantu ontology (theory of life) is the basis of Bantu psychology. Simply put, African people 
explain things by reference to supernatural forces, magical remedies, ancestor worship, ritual 
of forces, folklore and customs, oral traditions and legends, to name the few, and these vital 
forces penetrate and inform African thought. Horsthemke (2015) speaks of two analytical 
constructs: ethnophilosophy (oral tradition) and professional philosophy (written tradition) 
as a subtext of universal philosophy. Hence, Hountondji (1996) asserts that only universal 
knowledge (as we shall see in later sections, philosophy is defined as a theoretical discipline, 
while knowledge is defined as a justified true belief) transcends these narrow schools of 
thoughts (i.e. “knowledge of African” and “knowledge of the West”) – anchoring universal 
knowledge as a professional discipline. In light of this integration, the study on which this 
article is based, argued that:
• classical Western philosophy and indigenous African philosophy – and by implication of 
African philosophy of education – are part of a universal (united) knowledge system; 
• as a unity of a single discipline, a universal knowledge system is feasible, desirable and 
relevant in settling differences between the “Western epistemology” and “knowledge of 
Africa”;
• although, the national Curriculum Assessment Policy Statement (CAPS) promotes 
(scantily so) both academic knowledge and a universal knowledge system, the scale is 
tipped in favour of indigenous knowledge systems in South African schools; and 
• only a universal knowledge system is able to address global challenges and deal with 
domestic philosophical-educational issues in post-apartheid South Africa. 
2. Methodology
The author maintains that all research contains (or should contain) a review of literature and 
locates empirical research within the relevant theory or theoretical framework. A conceptual 
article too, proceeds on theoretical level and works (even if it reports on empirical research) 
purely with concepts and texts. Viewed this way, this conceptual article employs three methods 
of inquiry. On the descriptive side, the author looks at the meaning and features of Western 
philosophy, African philosophy and universal philosophy. On the analytical angle, he provides 
a critical analysis of the concept of African philosophy of education reflected in the CAPS. 
Lastly, from a normative perspective, he makes practical claims about how the CAPS African 
philosophy of education project can be meaningful and consistent with the changing world. 
Briefly, this article is the result of a process of investigation with two aspects. First, the article 
liberates us from internal conceptual complexity we get into when normally used words, such 
as ‘indigenous knowledge systems’ idle in our minds. Second, the article presents possible 
alternatives to this popular conceptual use in curriculum policy in South African schools. 
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3. What is Western philosophy? 
What is Western philosophy4? The term “philosophy” comes from the ancient Greek words, 
philo meaning “love” and sophia meaning “wisdom” – the love of wisdom (Akinpelu, 1987: 1; 
Lacey, 1976: 59; Kanu, 2014: 87; Plato, 1994: 190; Runes, 1960: 234 & Scruton, 2007). The 
concept is attributed Protagoras (575–495 bc), a Greek philosopher, scientist and religious 
scholar. In Plato’s dialogue, Protagoras (1991), Socrates describes Protagoras to his friend 
as “the wisest man alive” (1991: 1). Socrates’ friend concurs, “He is the only man who is wise 
… one who is knowledgeable in learned matters” (1991: 2–4). Protagoras’s love for wisdom is 
succinctly encapsulated in this Protagorean public statement (O’Meara, 1989: 42–43): 
Philosophy is indeed, it seems, is a road … chose that philosophy and that road to 
wisdom … the philosophy which progresses through immaterial eternal intelligible objects 
that always remain the same and do not admit in themselves of destruction or change, 
like its subject-matter, is unerring and firm, producing grounded and unswerving proof.
Interpreting O’Meara’s quote, we can see that philosophy is “a kind of agony” (extreme 
mental suffering) (Strangroom & Garvey, 2012: 76). This metaphor of philosophy as a road 
takes one to the “intelligible world of truth postulated by the objects of knowledge, which are 
perfect, eternal and unchanging” (Dupré, 2007: 9). Since then, Protagoras’s philosophy has 
passed into common usage. Recently, it has been given two meanings, namely that of a 
science of questions (asking wise and foolish questions) and a general set of beliefs (general 
outlook on the world) (Luthuli, 1982: 19; Scruton, 2007: 552; Standish, 2014: 6; Waghid, 
2016: 455). As the reader will see in this section, African philosophical literature rests on 
what Hountondji (1996; 47) calls a “confusion”, a confusion between the strict (science of 
questioning) use on the one hand and the popular (general beliefs) use, on the other.
4. What is African philosophy?
Hountondji (1996: 33) defines African philosophy as “a set of texts, especially the set of texts 
written by Africans and described as philosophy by their authors themselves”. But beyond this 
usage, lies a begging question: what feature should African philosophy take, ethnophilosophy 
(oral literature) or academic (written literature)? Interestingly, Hountondji challenges oral 
tradition, i.e. Tempels’s (1959) reconstruction of Bantu philosophy as a collective system of 
beliefs and supports written tradition, namely Pythagoras’ theoretical discipline or science of 
questioning. Hountondji (1996: 103–104) contends, “oral tradition favours the consolidation 
of knowledge into dogmatic, intangible systems, whereas archival transmission promotes 
better the possibility of a critique of knowledge between individuals and from one generation 
to another”. To drive this point home, philosophy existed in the West, Hountondji asserts, 
because “the history of the West is not directly cumulative but critical: it moves forward not 
through a mere plurality of knowledge … but through the periodical questioning of established 
knowledge, each questioning being a crisis” (1996: 104). So, what is likely to give African 
philosophy a disciplinary character? Bensusan (2016: 255) notes that philosophy is a 
discipline for two reasons: it involves beliefs about the world that are singularly different from 
mythical or ideological beliefs; and it investigates the world using distinct concepts, principles, 
assumptions and methods. In this sense, but only in this sense, it seems to the author we can 
speak of African philosophy as a single, universal discipline – a concept of African philosophy 
of education that the author advocates for in the CAPS. 
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5. What is universal philosophy?
If we accept, as the author believes we must, Locke’s (1960: 304) thesis that “individuals 
possess strength and reason according to the dictates of the Law of Reason”, then human 
beings by nature are philosophers in pursuit of knowledge – the Protagoras road to wisdom. In 
other words, philosophy is a universal activity not confined to Western Pythagoras or African 
Hountondji. From this point of view, it is possible, as Le Grange (2007: 586) spurs us to disrupt 
the dichotomy between classical Western philosophy and an African indigenous worldview 
by creating “third spaces or interstitial spaces”. As Odour (2012, cited in Horsthemke, 2015: 
18–19) aptly points out, “universalists would maintain that … African philosophy is first and 
foremost philosophy before it is African”. Equally, Hountondji (1997: 13–18) expands this point 
and says the integration of the Third World (i.e. the developing world) into the world processes 
of knowledge production entails “a push of endogenous elements of knowledge4 to the 
periphery … the ability to shift from one mode of thought and one logical universe to another. 
[…] The endogenous become ‘indigenous’ in and through such a world-widening process.” 
There are three points worth noting about this “new knowledge space”. First, if we treat the 
so-called “Western thought” and “African thought” as unique, distinct, opposite philosophies, 
we are unwittingly perpetuating “narrow provincialism”, to use Amin’s (1989) phrase (cited 
in Moll, 2002: 11). Second, Kanu (2014: 92) maintains that philosophy is an “all-inclusive 
enterprise, a universal activity not limited to whites or blacks, nor confined to the peoples of 
the West and the East”. Third, instead, universal knowledge takes the locale as the basis of 
international knowledge production – far from “permitting Western triumphalism or the retrieval 
of pre-colonial African tradition” (Enslin & Horsthemke, 2016: 188). It is clear therefore that 
there are three streams of thought that have emerged in the wake of Protagoras’s concept of 
philosophy and Hountondji’s (1996) definition of African philosophy: popular (or indigenous) 
knowledge, professional (or academic) knowledge and universal (single) knowledge. The 
focus now turns to a debate between African knowledge and Western knowledge. 
6. African and Western knowledge: Going beyond the two poles 
Seepe (2000: 119) writes, “Africanisation of knowledge … refers to a process of placing the 
African worldview at the centre of analysis … [and] advocates for the need to foreground 
African indigenous knowledge systems to address [Africa’s] problems and challenges”. Why 
is there a need to re-centre the African worldview and foreground an indigenous knowledge 
outlook? According to Horsthemke (2015: 21), the motivation is easy to discern and explains it 
considering the “denigration, suppression and exploitation of the traditional knowledge systems” 
from Western colonialism to date. To put it bluntly, Ochieng (2010) sees the call to Africanise 
knowledge as a response to Western barbarism. Santos (2014, cited in Le Grange, 2016: 4) 
describes the dissemination of (indigenous) knowledge as “the murder of knowledge … the 
death of the knowledge of the subordinated culture … [t]he loss of epistemological confidence … 
the epistemicides perpetrated by hegemonic Eurocentric modernity”. In the eyes of Lumumba-
Kosongo (2000: 145), “[i]n Africa, knowledge within the Western educational context was 
transmitted through the institutions associated with [slave] capitalism, colonialism and slavery, 
such as churches and schools.” Does this mean that we are in an endless battle of the dominant 
European centre on the one hand, and a push to recentring Africa, on the other? 
A universal knowledge system is not only possible, if the author may say so in a Kantian 
spirit, but a categorical imperative, especially in enabling Africa’s recentring project in the 
global “processes of knowledge production” (Hountondji 1997: 13). However, the recentring 
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project needs to confront its theoretical inadequacy of indigenous knowledge captured by 
Horsthemke and Enslin (2008: 217) as the “collective singular” that is often employed in 
African philosophy of education – a single, collective, unreflective and implicit worldview of 
African people – “African reality”, “African experience in its totality” and “indigenous African 
epistemology” (Lebakeng, Manthiba & Dalindjebo, 2006: 76; Ramose, 1998: vi). It is no 
longer tenable to deny Sartre’s (1974) transphenomenality of being, that is, human beings 
have absolute individuality and absolute freedom, and the self is a construct that is built and 
rebuilt and it can be changed and reconstructed as we choose. In the face of philosophy as a 
universal enterprise, it is therefore crucial for the advocates of indigenous knowledge systems 
to re-think their call and go beyond Western and African philosophies and their theoretical 
inadequacies and Sartre’s transphenomenality of being. 
Letsekha (2013) made a call for a reconceptualisation of the term “Africanisation” – and 
by implication of indigenous knowledge systems. This means that the conceptual use of 
African philosophy as a general set of beliefs or collective systems of beliefs is in desperate 
need of definition, analysis and critical evaluation. In two of his famous passages, Hountondji 
puts it this way:
African philosophy, like any other philosophy, cannot possibly be a collective worldview. 
We do not need a closed system to which all of us can adhere and which we can exhibit 
to the outside world (Hountondji, 1996: 53). 
Bantu philosophy is shown to be a myth. To destroy this myth once and for all, and to clear our 
conceptual ground for a genuine theoretical discourse (Hountondji 1996: 44) … philosophy is 
… essentially an open process, a restless, unfinished quest, not closed knowledge (1996: 71).
What does it then mean to reconceptualise “African philosophy”? Two instances can be given. 
First, it should meet three basic philosophical tasks central to the clarification of any general set 
of beliefs. Analysis of African philosophy itself, which specifies its elements; synthesis of African 
philosophy, merging it with academic philosophy to foster universal knowledge and improving 
African philosophy, for example, the concept “African philosophy” should be used in a strictly 
theoretical sense, and not in the popular, ideological sense. Second, by reorienting African 
philosophical discourse in this way, it is better placed to define, justify and defend itself on 
rational grounds (Nsamenang, 2011: 60). In the absence of clarification and critical evaluation 
of African collective beliefs, we end up with an uncritical and unargued acceptance of a false 
dichotomy between good, indigenous knowledge and bad, Western knowledge, or the other 
way around – and that is not useful. It is not useful because African philosophers should “take 
the word philosophy in the active, not passive, sense” as Hountondji (1996: 53) maintains. 
Moll (2002) supports the claim that a universal knowledge system is able to resolve 
the debate between African knowledge and Western knowledge. To defend his position, 
Moll revisits a number of African philosophers and psychologists committed to a universal 
knowledge system that transcends Eurocentric knowledge and African knowledge. Starting 
with Amin’s (1989) defence of universal inquiry, Moll (2002: 1) maintains that Afrocentrism 
and Eurocentrism, as two positions in the philosophy of knowledge, in fact entail each 
other – Eurocentric thinkers are blind to the entailed opposite while African thinkers believe 
there is nothing to be done about it. It is against this mutual entailment that we encounter 
the Eurocentric and Afrocentric “theoretical inadequacy”, which compels the advocates of 
these positions to “start to develop Africa in a universal system of thought”. As Hountondji 
(1997: 8–17) convincingly demonstrates:
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[R]esearch in the peripheral countries is … tied to the local scene, it is trapped in 
particularistic details, unable and unambitious to break to the level of universal … it is in 
such a context that … traditional knowledge must be placed … [we] need to move beyond 
the present impasse … beyond the mute coexistence of discourses, to examine each and 
every mode of thought within their specific frames, then, if possible, to bring them face 
to face within the unifying context … such option for a rational approach requires … to 
create bridges, to re-create the unity of knowledge, or in simpler, deeper terms, the unity 
of the human being. … Endogenous knowledge appear[s] to be a better choice.
By way of a brief summary, the author maintains that: man is by nature a philosopher, 
“characterised by a ceaseless quest for knowledge” (Luthuli, 1982: 31); philosophy is a 
universal practice not confined to Western or African people; it is possible, as Le Grange 
(2007: 586) argues, to disrupt the dichotomy between classical Western philosophy and 
African indigenous worldviews. As Horsthemke (2015: 23) also states, “a rapprochement 
between so-called indigenous and non-indigenous’ insights is not only possible but desirable 
– educationally”. Such is, regrettably not the case with CAPS – on the contrary, the policy 
document promotes indigenous knowledge systems – the claim that this article advocates and 
intends to demonstrate. The key question therefore is: which concept of African philosophy 
of education is reflected in the CAPS? It is to the African philosophy of education and critical 
analysis of CAPS that we now turn.
African philosophy of education and CAPS: Indigenous, professional or 
universal?
In the light of the three streams of thought discussed in the preceding sections, this article 
provides a critical discussion of the national CAPS. To this end, the author argues that:
• there is an untenable mixture of indigenous, academic and universal philosophies within 
the document;
• indigenous knowledge systems lack a clear, coherent and unambiguous definition of 
“knowledge”; and
• the emphasis on indigenous knowledge systems is based on a weak understanding of 
constitutional democratic education. 
The author concurs with Le Grange’s (2007: 581) assertion that “the inclusion of 
indigenous knowledge in South African curriculum policy statements [wa]s a positive step and 
could provide opportunities for debate on interaction(s) between Westerns and indigenous 
worldviews”. The underlying principles of the CAPS point to a combination of philosophies of 
education5 in South African schools. To illustrate this point, two principles and the subsequent 
aim of the CAPS as far as this aspect of policy, i.e. indigenous knowledge is concerned, read:
• valuing indigenous knowledge systems: acknowledging the rich history and heritage of 
this country as important contributors to nurturing the values contained in the Constitution 
(Department of Education [DoE], 2012: 5);
• active and critical learning: encouraging an active and critical approach to learning, rather 
than rote and uncritical learning of given truths (DoE, 2012: 4); and
• to promote knowledge in local contexts, while sensitive to global imperatives (DoE, 2012: 4).
The CAPS philosophy of education is questionable, especially if one considers the urgent 
need to disrupt Western philosophy and African indigenous worldviews, for forming a single 
knowledge system. Apart from being questionable, the CAPS philosophy is untenable because 
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it promotes “differences of content” (Hountondji, 1996: 56). First, indigenous knowledge 
emphasises African history and preserving its cultural heritage through songs, poems and 
stories. Second, academic, professional philosophy fosters active, critical and inquiring 
citizens in post-apartheid South African schools. Third, universal philosophy seeks to promote 
local knowledge responsive to the global context. The difficulty is that at present, CAPS does 
not have a settled philosophy (of education); it is at the crossroads and is stretched and pulled 
in different directions. What should be the response to this state of affairs? Only a return to the 
source can enlighten us. Africans should not be afraid of thinking new thoughts. Simply put, 
Africans should appreciate academic philosophy as a window to universalism or the unity of 
knowledge in South African schools.
But, what is knowledge? What are indigenous knowledge systems? Which knowledge 
systems are taught and learnt by learners in post-apartheid South African schools? Hospers 
(1997) distinguishes three ways of knowing: knowledge by acquaintance (knowledge of a 
person, place or thing, e.g., I know that Cyril Ramaphosa is the president of the Republic 
of South Africa), practical knowledge (knowledge how, e.g. I know how to write a letter) 
and propositional knowledge (knowledge that, e.g. does God exist?). Although, there is no 
definition of indigenous knowledge systems, the CAPS attempts to reclaim Africa’s “collective 
singular” by re-acquainting and re-familiarising school learners with –
• African religion (Life Orientation Grades 4–6; 11–12 years of age);
• cultural rites of passage (e.g. important stages in the individual’s life in South African 
cultures: birth, baptism, wedding and death and cultural heritage (Life Orientation Grades 
4–6; 11–12 years of age);
• oral traditions and scriptures of major religions and community or indigenous games (Life 
Orientation Grades 7–9; 13–15 years of age);
• indigenous medicine, such as healing properties of the aloe and indigenous knowledge 
systems, such as mountains and ancestors (Social Sciences Grades 4–6; 10–12 years 
of age);
• indigenous people’s interpretation of nationalism as a system of self-defence, whereby 
they aimed to unify commonly oppressed peoples (History, Grades 10–12; 16–18 years 
of age);
• indigenous culture of collective cooperation as a form of resistance against apartheid 
(History, Grades 10–12; 16–18 years of age); and
• ethical traditions and/or religious laws and indigenous belief systems of major religions 
(Life Orientation Grades 10–12; 16–18 years of age).
• There are three points worth noting about “indigenous knowledge” in the CAPS document.
• First, there is an overlap between knowledge by acquaintance, in other words, knowledge 
of African religion, cultural rites of passage, the role of oral traditions and sculptures, 
African mountains and ancestors as well as practical knowledge. (This involves the 
use indigenous medicine, systems of self-defence, indigenous culture of collective 
cooperation, indigenous games and ethical traditions and/or religious laws and indigenous 
belief systems.) 
• Second, there is an assumption that acquaintance with African knowledge is shared by 
Africans of the blood (African defined by racial terms) and Africans of the soil (African 
defined by geographical or territorial terms) to use Mazrui’s (2009) phrase. 
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• Third, as Horsthemke (2016: 583) argues, practical “knowledge of Africa” is dubious 
in terms of its “purported knowledge-content and its epistemic status”, as the author 
demonstrated at the beginning of this section. 
• Commendable modesty, no doubt, but re-acquainting and re-claiming African epistemology 
is only one aspect of individual development. Of equal importance, is the pursuit of 
knowledge for its own sake, the so-called “knowledge that”, or embarking on the road to 
endless wisdom. 
• The author maintains that CAPS should be concerned with Hospers’ (1997) third way, i.e. 
the primary (propositional) knowledge. This form of knowledge, Hospers argues, is based 
on three requirements or the classical analysis of the concepts of knowing: 
• the statement must be true (objective knowledge); 
• you must believe that the statement is true (the subjective component knowledge); and 
• there must be good evidence for believing the statement. 
Put it differently, knowledge is defined as justified true belief. Now, if African collective 
knowledge is incompatible with Western professional knowledge as far as knowledge by 
acquaintance and practical knowledge are concerned, the implication is that CAPS promotes 
different truths, beliefs and justification. If, indigenous and non-indigenous Africans share 
features, such as “truth-content and truth-functionality” as Horsthemke (2004: 584) puts it, 
why use a collective singular “African knowledge” in post-apartheid South African schools? 
One caveat is needed here: the emphasis solely on indigenous knowledge systems is 
restrictive and misleading, especially if one considers that the Bantu ontology (theory of life) is 
the basis of Bantu psychology, i.e. it means indigenous knowledge is not subjected to criticism 
but is regarded as enduring truth. We need a common, not a narrow African philosophical 
framework for CAPS. It is quite clear, then that unless we justify African collective beliefs 
there is no ground to make claims for African knowledge but acquaintance and practice of 
indigenous knowledge systems. 
As already mentioned, indigenous knowledge systems acknowledge the rich history and 
heritage of South Africa as a vehicle to nurture the values contained in the Constitution of the 
Republic. However, the emphasis on knowledge by acquaintance and practical knowledge is 
unlikely to promote active, critical and inquiring learners in South African schools. As we have 
seen, the language of “collective singular” paints a picture of a child, incapable of theoretical 
discipline, unable to use universal philosophical concepts, principles, assumptions and 
methods, to employ Bensusan’s (2016) words. Let me argue one small, but significant, point 
of disagreement, the understanding CAPS shows of indigenous knowledge systems flies in 
the face of a liberal constitutional democracy, especially when it comes to learners’ abilities 
and inclination to act for themselves. However, CAPS’ “learner-imagery” is one of “a flock of 
sheep innocently nibbling the grass side by side” (Mill, 1975: 345). There is a need, therefore, 
to consider Gutmann’s (1987) theory of democratic education that is built on two principles: 
non-repression that secures freedom to deliberate rationally among different ways of life; and 
non-discrimination, which requires that all learners participate as citizens in shaping the future of 
citizenship education South Africa. These are the educational benefits of democratic education: 
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• safeguarding the principle of active and critical learning also considered “core” by the 
national CAPS; 
• unlocking learners’ intellectual abilities and critical faculties that constitute the cornerstone 
of South Africa’s democracy; and 
• recognising human agency, that is, learners’ capacity to think, act independently and make 
free choices among different philosophies of life. 
African philosophy of education: Endogenous knowledge 
In the words of Horsthemke and Enslin (2008: 2005), African philosophy of education, i.e. 
“‘oral tradition’, ‘African traditional worldview’ (or ‘narrow communitarianism’) and ‘African 
experience’” is strikingly similar to characteristics of Fundamental Pedagogies based on the 
ideology of Christian National Education (CNE), its history and its basic beliefs. In 1948, the 
Institute for CNE published a well-known pamphlet setting out Christian education policy. The 
introduction of the pamphlet stated: 
Afrikaans-speaking children should have a Christian-Nationalist education, for the 
Christian and Nationalist spirit of the Afrikaner nation must be preserved and developed. 
… By Christian, in this context, we mean according to the creeds of the three Afrikaner 
churches; by Nationalist we mean imbued with the love of one’s own, especially one’s own 
language, history, and culture. … Nationalism must be rooted in Christianity (Federasie 
van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings, 1948: 1). 
Equally, the Bantu Education Act (No. 90 of 1953) established Bantu schools with a black-
oriented education and black-oriented school curriculum “based on Black identity … Black 
thought … Black humanism … the idioms of Black culture … Black culture” (Luthuli, 1982: 
32–101). Three possible traps should be avoided in thinking about African philosophy of 
education neatly encapsulated in the CAPS: 
• an essentialist definition of African identity that suggests that there is only one authentic 
set of characteristics which all African people share and which do not alter across time – 
identities involve multiplicity, therefore rarely coherent and integrated (Woodward, 1997: 2); 
• Africans are not a solidified, undifferentiated and homogenous mass of people: this tends 
to ignore differences and the fact that “Africans” are individual subjects too; and 
• politics of collective identity that tends to accept historically inherited views escape critical 
scrutiny and constructive criticism. 
Such is, regrettably, the case with CAPS as was with CNE and Bantu education. At the heart 
of African philosophy of education should be the clarification and critical evaluation of the 
national CAPS. As Strawson (1973: 828) puts it, “one remembers the Kantian tenet that 
concepts are empty, have no significance for us, are not concepts for us, unless we can relate 
them to experiential conditions for their application”.
The author’s disquiet about CAPS’ preferred indigenous knowledge systems are its 
inability to clarify, defend and justify itself. Consequently, one doubts its educational benefits 
in the light of global and domestic philosophical-educational challenges, such as: 
• globalisation (that led to knowledge sharing) and neo-liberalism (and its privatisation 
of education that undermines theoretical knowledge) educational programmes that are 
suspicious of democratic human rights culture;
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• Africa’s scientific, intellectual and academic dependency, and African philosophers’ inability 
to embark on a quest for universality of philosophy as a basis for endogenous knowledge; 
• the need for African institutions of higher learning to undergo a process of decolonisation 
and arrest what Hountondji (1996: 56) describes as “African mythical exploration”; 
• the general unwillingness to choose and travel the road to wisdom calls for “the next stage 
of struggle, a reality that, unfortunately, never fails to arise, but whose battle must be 
waged (Gordon; 2016: 177); and 
• the demons of racism and xenophobia that drain one emotionally and intellectually 
(McKaiser, 2015: 1). 
All these global and national philosophical-educational issues taken together require 
policymakers to re-examine post-apartheid education and, by implication, the indigenous 
knowledge system in South Africa anew. In simple terms, the open nature of the aims of the 
CAPS attests to Carr’s (2004: 57) misgivings about “policy makers who make and implement 
educational decisions in a way which generally lacks intellectual rigour and in which serious and 
systematic reflection on the fundamental philosophical standpoint that informs their decisions 
is conspicuously absent”. If Carr’s charge holds, presenting the aims of African philosophy of 
education in such open terms leaves the CAPS without the necessary theoretical foundation 
to discipline learners in particular, or to address global and domestic problems and challenges 
as Seepe (2000) hopes. 
Amid the diverse but, deep down, so strangely similar genres, which conception of African 
philosophy should underpin education in post-apartheid South African schools? The author 
is in no hurry to answer this question, except to highlight possible pathways. One possibility, 
of course, is to revise and reformulate CAPS, since it operates in the realm of an academic 
curriculum (Govender & Fataar, 2015). However, that would be retrogressive and unhelpful. 
The issue, therefore, is how to make an African philosophy of education project meaningful. If 
such a course is followed, two mechanisms may be considered as ways of moving from where 
we are to where we ought to be. First, it involves reconceptualisation of African knowledge, 
i.e. acknowledging that this collective belief has a specific place within the wider field of 
beliefs. Second, African scholars should recognise professional philosophy for what it is, a 
free critical inquiry into problems raised by their intellectual and socio-political milieu (Green 
& Condy, 2016; Hountondji, 1996). Third, universal knowledge would require policymakers 
to explore ways of developing locally and regionally relevant policy that go beyond narrow 
provincialisms, but which is consistent with the changing world – the “freedom of movement of 
knowledge – knowledge in motion” as Mbembe (2016: 37–38) observes. 
7. Conclusion 
The author puts forward a conclusion, Hegel’s (1977) dialectical method best understood in 
terms of the concepts of thesis (the minds), antithesis (the result of the encounter between 
minds), which together produce a synthesis (the resolution into Western philosophy and 
African philosophy). According to Hegel’s conception, the battle for recognition between 
human minds leaves no room for cooperation between Western philosophy and African 
philosophy. The author alters this dialectical process in part, and maintains that endogenous 
knowledge is the third member of the triad – Western, African and endogenous knowledge – 
the latter being the unity of the other two. There is a far, nobler prospect of African philosophy 
of education in post-apartheid South African schools if indigenous knowledge (in itself) ceases 
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to regard itself as independent of Western philosophy (not-self). Historically and to date, 
African philosophy is arguably distinct from and identical to Western knowledge traditions. 
The cause of disagreement was, and still is, the identity in difference. Western philosophy and 
African philosophy should bury their narrow differences and “work together, recognising that 
what they have in common is much more than what separates them” (Budge, 1993: 154) – a 
unity of a single philosophy, of a single abstract subject matter, careful and systematic thinking 
(method) and way of life. 
8. Notes
• According to Hountondji (1996: 60), Bantu philosophy is a myth at work, the myth of 
primitive unanimity, with its suggestion that in “primitive” societies – that is to say, non-
Western societies – everybody always agrees with everybody else. Bantu philosophy 
is merely “a collective world-view, an implicit, spontaneous, perhaps even unconscious 
system of beliefs to which all Africans are supposed to adhere” (Hountondji, 1996: 60). 
• For our purpose, Raphael (1990: 8) interprets the main tradition of Western philosophy as 
having had two connected aims: the clarification of concepts, for the purpose of the critical 
evaluation of beliefs. Put differently, classical Western philosophy can best be described 
as a theoretical discipline with its own descriptive analysis and normative methods of 
inquiry. 
• For Kanu (2014: 92), philosophy is an “all-inclusive enterprise, a universal activity not 
limited to whites or blacks, nor confined to the peoples of the West and the East”. 
• Briefly, according to Hountondji (1997: 17), “endogenous knowledge evokes the origin 
of the kind of knowledge identified as an internal product drawn from a given cultural 
background, as opposed to any other category of knowledge which would be imported 
from elsewhere”.
• According to Waghid (2001: 210), philosophy of education is a practice to think with clarity 
and reflection about how educational matters are and what should be done in the realm 
of education.
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